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* Honorable Marvin Katz, United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Mauro Maschio appeals from a district court order 
granting summary judgment against him in an action he filed under 
the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act ("ADDCA"), 15 U.S.C. 
§§1221-25.  Because we conclude that the defendant, Prestige 
Motors, Inc., is not a "manufacturer" within the meaning of the 
ADDCA, we will affirm. 
 I. 
 Mercedes-Benz of North America is an affiliate of 
Daimler-Benz, a German manufacturer of luxury automobiles.  
Defendant Prestige Motors, Inc. is an authorized dealer of 
Mercedes-Benz vehicles.  Maschio is the principal owner of Euro-
Trade, U.S.A., Ltd., a corporation licensed to sell automobiles. 
 Maschio and Euro-Trade regularly purchased scarce 
"high-end" automobiles from authorized dealers, including several 
Mercedes-Benz dealers.  They would then resell them at a profit 
to customers desiring exotic vehicles not generally available in 
dealers' showrooms.  During 1989 and 1990, Maschio and Euro-Trade 
attempted to purchase sixteen new vehicles from Prestige at 
retail, intending to resell them to the general public.  There 
was no formal franchise agreement between Prestige and Euro-
Trade.  Instead, Prestige accepted orders on the same purchase 
order form it used when dealing with typical retail buyers.  
Prestige honored six of these contracts, but refused to deliver 
  
the remaining ten vehicles, allegedly because of pressure exerted 
on it by Mercedes Benz of North America to refrain from selling 
automobiles to Maschio. 
 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Prestige on the ADDCA claim, and after determining that 
complete diversity was lacking, dismissed the pendent 
state law causes of action.  It held that the purchase 
orders used in the series of vehicle purchases did not 
constitute a franchise agreement within the meaning of 
the ADDCA, a necessary element of any such case.     
 II. 
 The ADDCA is a remedial statute enacted to redress the 
economic imbalance and unequal bargaining power between large 
automobile manufacturers and local dealerships, protecting 
dealers from unfair termination and other retaliatory and 
coercive practices.  See, e.g., Hanley v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 
433 F.2d 708, 710-11 (10th Cir. 1970).  It is, essentially, a 
supplement to the national antitrust laws, passed to counter-
balance the economic leverage a manufacturer has over its 
ostensibly independent dealers, and its "control over [its] 
product in what amounts to quasi-integration to the retail level 
of distribution."  H.R. Rep. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3,  
reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N 4596, 4596, 4598.  There are four 
elements of an ADDCA cause of action: (1) the plaintiff must be 
an automobile dealer; (2) the defendant must be an "automobile 
manufacturer" engaged in commerce; (3) there must be a 
manufacturer-dealer relationship embodied in a written franchise 
  
agreement; and (4) the plaintiff must have been injured by the 
defendant's failure to act in good faith.  15 U.S.C. § 1222; 
Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 441 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
 Although the district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Prestige, concluding that the sixteen purchase orders 
did not constitute a franchise agreement, we will assume, without 
deciding, that there was a valid franchise agreement.1  We will 
further assume, without deciding both, that Euro-Trade was a 
dealer within the meaning of the Act, and that Prestige 
terminated its "franchise" in other than good faith.  We will 
instead simply analyze the narrow question of whether Prestige 
was a manufacturer under the ADDCA, which we conclude determines 
the outcome of Maschio's appeal. 
 It is axiomatic that our inquiry begins with the 
language of the statute.  28 U.S.C. § 1221 defines the term 
"automobile manufacturer" as 
 any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, or other form of business 
enterprise engaged in the manufacturing or 
assembling of passenger cars, trucks, or 
station wagons, including any person, 
partnership, or corporation which acts for 
and is under the control of such manufacturer 
or assembler in connection with the 
distribution of said automotive vehicles. 
                     
 
    1"An appellate court may affirm a correct decision by a 
lower court on grounds different than those used by the lower 
court in reaching its decision."  Erie Telecommunications, Inc. 
v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing 
cases). 
  
Prestige, of course, does not manufacture or assemble 
automobiles.  To be liable as a manufacturer, then, Prestige must 
be found to be both "acting for" and "under the control of" 
Mercedes-Benz. 
 Only three courts of appeals have had occasion to 
interpret § 1221(a).  The first considered "the 'control' 
requirement [to be] satisfied by showing corporate ownership and 
confluence of interest."  Colonial Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 
592 F.2d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1979).  In the other two, the 
issue was resolved by reference to agency law.  Stansifer v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 487 F.2d 59, 64 (9th Cir. 1973); 
Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 441 
(1st Cir. 1966). 
 These cases usually arise, however, in the context of 
distributors or importers that stand between the dealer and the 
physical manufacturer.  In those circumstances, courts will be 
justifiably concerned that physical manufacturers might attempt 
to avoid the ADDCA's requirements by placing a strawman between 
themselves and their dealers, thus insulating themselves from the 
duty to act in good faith.  In Rohlsen, for example, the court 
stated that "the inclusion of certain distributors in section 
1221(a) was designed only to prevent a manufacturer from 
circumventing its responsibilities under the act by transacting 
business with its dealers through alter egos."  360 F.2d at 437. 
 That context is not present here.  Mercedes-Benz of 
North America never agreed to accept Euro-Trade as a dealer.  Nor 
did Mercedes-Benz employ Prestige as an alter ego to impose 
  
onerous terms on Euro-Trade without running afoul of the ADDCA; 
each operated independently.  At most, Mercedes-Benz pressured 
Prestige to cease doing business with Euro-Trade because it 
objected to Euro-Trade's business.  Such a desire not to deal 
does not implicate the same sort of anticompetitive concerns that 
apparently motivated the drafters of the ADDCA, nor is it 
indicative of any motive on the part of the physical manufacturer 
to oppress the local "dealer" -- in this case Euro-Trade -- with 
whom the manufacturer never intended to deal at all. 
 III. 
 In sum, we decline to hold that Prestige became a 
"manufacturer" the moment it sold automobiles to Euro-Trade.  Nor 
do we conclude it was under a manufacturer's "control ... in 
connection with the distribution ..." of the automobiles.  
Instead, we hold that non-physical manufacturer status is limited 
to those situations in which the physical manufacturer has the 
potential to control an intermediary that acts for the 
manufacturer to avoid its duty to treat its dealers with good 
faith, thereby subverting the ADDCA.  For this reason, we will 
affirm the judgment of the district court. 
